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Abstract
In this paper I will analyze the loan amount to income level of individuals applying for mortgage loans in the
years following the financial recession. Additionally I will examine the impact that each independent variable
has on the overall loan amount. Underwriting looks at many of these variables when analyzing a loan to
determine a borrowers credit history. Here I will attempt to quantify the impact of some of these variables. I
will use time series analysis techniques to examine any trends and patterns within the ratio. It is hypothesized
that as applicant income increases, the loan amount applied for will increase at an even larger percentage, as
applicants now have more peace of mind and financial security.
This article is available in The Park Place Economist: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace/vol26/iss1/13
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I.       Introduction
It may seem hard to believe, but the modern 
mortgage as we know it today has only been around 
since 1934. Under the new Federal Housing Admin-
istration (FHA) guidelines, they set up programs to 
offer individuals loans for 80 % loan-to-value and 
higher (How Mortgages Work 2002). Loan-to-value, 
as defined by Investopedia(2017), is the amount of the 
mortgage lien divided by the appraised value of the 
property. This created more opportunities for the aver-
age American to own a home, and forced commercial 
banks to adopt similar lending policies. Initially this 
allowed the typical American, who couldn’t afford to 
make a down payment of 70 to 80 % under the old 
banking guidelines, to now qualify for a mortgage 
loan. However this new practice made mortgage lend-
ing far more risky; homeowners had far less invested 
into their homes, and were taking out increasingly 
larger loans that many could not afford. Financial in-
stitutions were searching for another measure to iden-
tify credit worthy customers and their ability to repay 
the mortgage loan. The debt-to-income ratio, or more 
simply the debt ratio, became a popular way to quanti-
fy risk, and measures an individual’s debt payment to 
overall income.
 Data obtained from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics and CoreLogic indicated that debt to income 
ratios were increasing in the years leading up to the 
housing market collapse of 2007. Banks and lenders 
alike were attempting to qualify more Americans for 
home loans that they could not afford all in an effort 
to boost their bottom line. Mortgage debt figures 
obtained from the Federal Reserve board of St. Louis 
showed that mortgage debt was rapidly rising in the 
years leading up to the housing bubble burst. With 
an increase in debt, and thus increased levels of risk, 
defaults and foreclosures could prove catastrophic to 
the housing market, which is exactly what happened. 
Homeowners with mortgage loans that they could not 
afford because they took on too much risk began to 
default and banks began to repossess their houses. The 
bubble burst and the housing market began to bottom 
out with the number of individual defaults in the mil-
lions per year (Equifax, 2017).Tighter regulations on 
mortgage loan qualifications were subsequently put in 
place, including stricter regulations on debt to income 
levels of individuals looking for a mortgage loan. A 
number of factors, including shock from the recent 
collapse and strict regulations set out by the United 
States government and other Government-Sponsored 
Enterprises forced debt to income ratios of individuals 
to decrease in the following years. Mortgage lenders 
Analyzing the Mortgage Loan Value and Associated 
Risk for a Commercial Bank 
Brandon Fricke
56 The Park Place Economist, Volume XXVI
seemingly began to issue loans only to those individu-
als deemed credit worthy and demonstrated the ability 
to repay their home loan.
Along with credit score, the debt ratio is one 
of the primary factors in deciding if an individual will 
qualify for a loan. It is a crucial measure of overall 
loan risk that financial institutions look for (CFPB 
2017). If the average loan value to income level is 
increasing it could signal individuals and financial 
institutions taking on more risk in financing mortgag-
es. Evidence from the Consumer Finance Protection 
Bureau suggests that borrowers with a higher debt to 
income ratio are more likely to run into trouble mak-
ing monthly mortgage payments. As recent history has 
shown us, high risk loans in the housing market can 
prove disastrous to the worldwide economy. As stat-
ed above, it is known that the loan amount to income 
ratio was increasing nationwide up until 2007 when 
it began to decline. In this paper I will analyze the 
loan amount to income level of individuals applying 
for mortgage loans in the years following the finan-
cial recession. Additionally I will examine the impact 
that each independent variable has on the overall loan 
amount. Underwriting looks at many of these variables 
when analyzing a loan to determine a borrowers credit 
history. Here I will attempt to quantify the impact of 
some of these variables. I will use time series analysis 
techniques to examine any trends and patterns within 
the ratio. It is hypothesized that as applicant income 
increases, the loan amount applied for will increase 
at an even larger percentage, as applicants now have 
more peace of mind and financial security. 
 II.      Data and Methods
 In order to test my hypothesis relating appli-
cant income to loan amount, data was obtained from a 
commercial bank in Topeka, Kansas. This unique time 
series analysis study will focus on the bank’s mortgage 
lending practices from 2010 until 2017. Data on appli-
cant’s income and the corresponding loan amount will 
encompass the greater Topeka, Kansas geographical 
area. The loan amount and applicant income figures I 
will analyze have no specific frequency as loan vol-
umes have fluctuated throughout the past seven years. 
From January of 2010 to September of 2017, the range 
of data I will be analyzing, the volume of loans per 
month and even per day fluctuated due to numerous 
factors. With a total of approximately 3000 loans to 
analyze over the past seven years we have an average 
of 400 loans each year. Additionally loan amount and 
applicants income are recorded in thousands of dol-
lars, thus making it simpler to examine.  
 As previously stated, there is no specific fre-
quency to the data analyzed as each day and month 
have different loan volumes. Mortgage lending is a 
heavily seasonal industry according to the National 
Association of Realtors, and this trend is displayed in 
my data as well. During the winter months, typically 
November to January, loan volume is considerably 
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lower than during the late spring and summer months. 
Because of this discrepancy it will be important to test 
for seasonality to statistically confirm our assumptions 
as well as seasonally adjust the series so we can ac-
curately analyze trends and patterns. Graph One takes 
all 3000 data points and averages each month’s loan 
amounts and corresponding income values resulting in 
a total of 93 months to evaluate. When looking at the 
graph there is a small but noticeable upward trend in 
both variables values over the past seven years. This 
could be due to a number of factors including easing 
of credit requirements and economic recovery as I 
move farther and farther away from the financial crisis 
and housing meltdown of 2007-2008. Another point 
to note is that as the applicants stated income fluctu-
ates, the loan amount applied for closely resembles 
a similar pattern with a slight lag associated with it.  
However, both series show a considerable amount of 
volatility in them, making it difficult to predict future 
values. 
 Because of the volatility and seasonality 
associated with my data I experience a wide range of 
maximum and minimum values. Average loan amount, 
excluding loan and income figures above 500, fluctu-
ates from 38 to 238 with applicant’s income showing 
similar fluctuations. One possible explanation to this 
is a few data outliers that are present in our two se-
ries, which distorts the mean for those months. When 
looking at the raw unadjusted data there are four loan 
amounts above 1000, or $1,000,000 since I am view-
ing the variables in thousands of dollars. By removing 
these outliers I can better analyze the data and view 
any patterns present, excluding the statistical anoma-
lies. Graph Two shows a scatter plot of loan amount to 
total income with a logarithmic regression line fitted 
to the series. A large majority of the data points are 
loan amounts below 500 and stated incomes below 
500. Graph Three now shows a scatter plot of the data 
points with the loan amounts and stated income levels 
above 500 excluded. As one can see, the fitted loga-
rithmic regression line shows a similar trend to that 
of diminishing marginal returns. As income increases 
loan amount increases as well, but only to a certain 
extent as shown by the regression line flattening out. 
This is in contradiction to my previous hypothesis, that 
loan amount would increases exponentially relative to 
increased income. 
 For this study I will be using the following es-
timation equation to analyze any correlation between 
loan amount and income level:
Δ Loan Amount = α + βΔ Income + βΔ Time
The change in loan amount is dependent upon 
a constant factor plus the change in the independent 
variables applicant income and time. With an improv-
ing economy and a recovering housing market income 
as well as loan amount would be expected to rise. 
Additionally, as income increases consumers will have 
greater purchasing power and the increased ability 
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to take a larger mortgage loan. Because the economy 
continues to improve, the housing market has been re-
covering and annual inflation has been increasing. The 
variable time is expected to have a positive correlation 
with loan amount. Thus the dependent variable and 
both independent variables are expected to take pos-
itive values. Limitations for this analysis come from 
the volatility of the series as well as the seasonality 
component which will be corrected when I adjust the 
variables for seasonality.  
 In this study I will use EViews software to 
analyze the data and use ordinary least squares to run a 
regression. Additionally I will use the ADF and KPSS 
tests to check for unit roots and stationarity in the se-
ries. Testing for unit roots and stationarity, a common 
time series practice, will determine the order of inte-
gration of our series.  Finally I will test the residuals to 
ensure they behave normally and would not adversely 
affect my regression results.
 III.       Literature Review and Theory
 The correlation between loan amount and 
stated income values has been heavily analyzed since 
the housing crisis of 2008 because it is a strong mea-
sure of risk associated with the mortgage loan. The 
risk from the bank’s perspective has been analyzed 
with the leverage ratio, or capital to assets that a bank 
uses to fund a loan. Furlong and Keeley studied the 
relationship between bank’s leverage ratio and the risk 
associated with their portfolio investments (Furlong 
& Keeley 1989). They found that as capital increased, 
and thus the leverage ratio also increased, banks began 
to invest in more prudent assets which reduced overall 
default risk. A higher leverage ratio is thus considered 
safer for banks as they must use more of their own 
capital to finance loans or sell off the most risky assets 
and investments. 
 A 2010 study by Adrian and Shin found evi-
dence supporting Furlong and Keeley’s original hy-
pothesis. Their study furthered the original work and 
found evidence of pro-cyclical patterns in the capital 
to asset ratio. The pro cyclical nature of the leverage 
ratio acts as an amplification mechanism to business 
cycles upturns and downturns (Adrian & Shin 2010). 
As asset values increase from an improving econo-
my a bank’s leverage ratio falls and they will have a 
surplus of capital. Banks will then purchase additional 
assets or securities to more than just restore the previ-
ous leverage ratio. An upward pressure on asset prices 
follows and thus the upward spiral begins. Equally, a 
negative shock to asset prices would trigger a down-
ward spiral of leverage. Leading up to the 2008 finan-
cial crisis asset prices and mortgage-backed securities 
were rising rapidly, thus lowering banks’ leverage 
ratios. Banks began to make riskier investments into 
the sub-prime market granting credit to borrowers who 
did not have the ability to repay. What followed was 
the subsequent financial crisis and downturn in the 
business cycle. 
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These findings are in contradiction to the 
results of previous studies from Koehn that found the 
opposite effect; an increase in the leverage ratio was 
associated with an increase in investment risk (Koehn, 
1979). His explanation was that as the capital-to-asset 
ratio rises, banks can afford to give out fewer loans as 
their capital is tied up elsewhere. Thus they would be 
incentivized to invest in more risky assets to maintain 
a profit level. More recent studies from Lee and Hsieh 
found similar results, and concluded that the parallel 
relationship between capital and risk levels was due to 
moral hazard and bank managers not doing enough to 
avoid unnecessary risk (Lee & Hsieh, 2013).
  Furthermore, numerous studies have been con-
ducted in determining if a loan will be approved and 
how much debt can be issued to a borrower. Loan to 
value, according to Investopedia, is one of the primary 
measures if a loan will be approved. In 1992 Vandell 
used a bi-proportional hazard model to examine risk 
associated with mortgage loans (Vandell, 1992). He 
found that at the individual borrower level, loan-to-
value was the primary determinant of mortgage de-
fault. Banks denying loans based on inadequate loan 
to value ratios are highly correlated with a reduction 
in mortgage defaults. In 1994 Abraham furthered the 
original findings and concluded that while loan-to-val-
ue is highly correlated with default rates, the debt-cov-
erage ratio has greater explanatory power in deter-
mining mortgage defaults. Similar to Vandell’s study, 
my study examines the risk associated with individual 
borrowers at the microeconomic level. Additionally I 
am also analyzing the loan to income ratio of individ-
uals to examine default risk, which has proven to be a 
good measure. 
Underwriting standards are the final measure 
in approving or denying a loan. It will determine how 
much debt can be issued, the terms of the loan, and an-
alyzes the borrowing history of customers. Underwrit-
ers must determine if a borrower can repay the loan, 
analyzing income, employment, and bank statements. 
Based on these factors as well as the credit history of 
the borrower will determine if the loan amount applied 
for will be approved. In 1996, Brent Ambrose devel-
oped a model of the market for commercial real estate 
loans based on these variables used in property deci-
sion making (Ambrose 1996). Underwriting standards, 
according to Ambrose, determine the supply price of 
mortgage loans. He also found that as lines of credit 
tighten, and thus underwriting standards tighten, the 
loan to value ratio is forced to decrease. With a larger 
down payment by consumers banks can now finance 
the loan using less of their own capital and still main-
tain adequate leverage ratios, thus ensuring they make 
prudent investments. 
Many of the above studies analyze macroeco-
nomic data with a wide scope and scale. My study 
is more focused to microeconomic data analyzing a 
single commercial bank. Similar to Ambrose’s 1996 
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study, I am attempting to quantify how much these 
variables that underwriting examines affect the over-
all loan amount. Adding to the above theories I will 
analyze the risk associated with the banks mortgage 
lending strategies and attempt to calculate what vari-
ables impact the loan amount. I will determine if the 
commercial bank analyzed is increasing their risk 
levels by granting loans to less credit worthy borrow-
ers, indicated by an increasing spread in loan amount 
to applicant income.  
 IV.        Results
 As shown in Graph One, loan amount and ap-
plicant income have proven to be volatile series since 
2010. Some of this volatility could be due to the heavy 
seasonality component associated with mortgage lend-
ing. As stated before, mortgage lending is a heavily 
seasonal industry according to the National Associa-
tion of Realtors. To compensate for this, I have sea-
sonally adjusted both the loan amount and applicant 
income using the Census X12 method and the seasonal 
means for both variables can be seen in Graph Four. 
The final regression equation will examine seasonally 
adjusted variables. 
 Before running the OLS regression we must 
ensure that the series is stationary and does not contain 
a unit root. To do so I will run standard time series 
tests, namely the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and 
Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) tests to 
ensure my series is stationary and would not produce 
spurious results. Table One shows the ADF and KPSS 
tests for the variable applicant income. I can, at the 
99% confidence level, reject the null hypothesis of the 
ADF test and assume that the series does not contain 
a unit root in levels. Furthermore when examining the 
KPSS test I cannot confidently reject, and thus must 
accept, the null hypothesis that the series is stationary 
in levels. Table Two again runs the same ADF and 
KPSS tests now on the variable loan amount and finds 
similar results. I can again assume, with 99% confi-
dence, that the series does not contain a unit root in 
levels and that the series is stationary. Additionally, 
because I can confidently assume there is no unit root 
present and the series is stationary in levels I say my 
series is integrated of order zero, I(0). 
 With all of the variables stationary and the pre-
liminary transformations completed it is now possible 
to run a regression using ordinary least squares. The 
basic regression equation generated is as follows: 
LOAN =24.566 + 1.058 INCOME + 0.2838 TIME + 
112.6 DUMMY
 Seasonally adjusted loan amount is the depen-
dent variable. It is a function of a constant plus appli-
cant’s income as well as time and a dummy variable. 
Again, the variables are in terms of thousands and the 
coefficients are thus reported accordingly. Addition-
ally I have added a dummy variable to the regression 
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equation for December of 2016. Graph Five shows the 
residual diagnostics when no dummy variable was im-
plemented and it is clear that the residual for this time 
period takes a value well outside the standard devia-
tion. Thus I have implemented a dummy variable for 
December of 2016 to remove the residual data outlier. 
Table Three outlines the regression results in 
detail with the total observations, or months analyzed, 
being 93. The constant term of the equation indicates 
that when all other variables take a value of zero, the 
loan amount will still be $24,566. Applicant’s income, 
as expected, had the greatest impact on loan amount 
out of all the variables analyzed. For every $1,000 
increase in applicant’s income, the loan amount would 
increase by $1,058. More simply, a $1.00 increase in 
income results in a $1.06 increase in loan amount. Fur-
thermore, the income variable is significant at the 99% 
confidence level. Additionally I have added a variable 
to capture how the loan amount will change over time. 
Time, measured in months, is statistically significant 
at the 99% confidence level. As each month passes 
the loan amount will increase by $284. This could be 
due to a number of factors including an improving 
economy and inflation increasing. Time, while not as 
impactful as income, still has a significant influence on 
the loan amount. The adjusted R-squared measures the 
variability in the dependent variable as explained by 
the independent variables in the model, but adjusts the 
statistic based on the number of independent variables 
used. For this regression the adjusted R-squared took a 
value of 0.5266, meaning that 52.6% of the variability 
in loan amount is explained by our independent vari-
ables. The F-statistic, which assumes that all coeffi-
cients actually have a value of zero, can be confidently 
rejected and thus we can assume our variables have 
explanatory power.  
We must also test the residuals of the regres-
sion to ensure they have a constant variance, show no 
signs of autocorrelation, and behave normally. When 
measuring for autocorrelation we use the Breusch 
Godfrey test which has a null hypothesis that the 
residuals are not auto-correlated. Because the p-value 
falls outside our range of confidence we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis, and thus must assume that the 
residuals do not show signs of autocorrelation. Addi-
tionally we must use the Jarque Berra test to examine 
the normality of the residuals. The null hypothesis for 
this test is that the residuals are normally distributed. 
Because the P-value falls well outside our range of 
confidence we cannot reject the null hypothesis and 
thus must assume that the residuals behave normally. 
Finally we must test for heteroscedasticity, or that the 
residuals have a constant variance, using White’s test. 
Because our p-value is above 0.05 we can assume that 
our residuals are homoscedastic. Overall our residuals 
show no signs of autocorrelation, are normally distrib-
uted, and have constant variance. Thus our residuals 
should not adversely affect our regression results. 
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 V.        Conclusions
As one can see from Graph One, applicants 
income closely follows the pattern and trend of loan 
amount. This broadly indicates that the bank is not 
resorting to risky mortgage lending practices, as the 
ratio of applicant’s income to loan amount is relatively 
stable. If the spread between loan amount and appli-
cant income was increasing it would have signified 
borrowers taking on more debt and increasing risk 
to both parties. Additionally loan amount does not 
increase exponentially as income increases. In fact this 
study shows that as income is increasing loan amount 
also increases, but only to a certain extent. These 
findings could be due in part by bank size and lending 
limits.  
As stated before, the data collected for this 
study was obtained from a commercial bank in To-
peka, Kansas. Because there were varying amounts 
of loans issued each month no two months were the 
same. For simplicity I averaged each month’s loan 
amount and income to have a total of 93 data points 
from January 2010 to September of 2017. Due to the 
seasonality and low volume of loans in the winter 
months I removed all seasonal components of the data 
using the Census X12 method. Thus the regression 
equation used included the seasonally adjusted vari-
ables.  Before running a regression I tested the data for 
unit roots and stationarity using the ADF and KPSS 
tests respectively. Both variables, loan amount and ap-
plicant income, showed no unit root and were station-
ary in levels. As such the series is said to be integrated 
of order zero, I(0). 
As anticipated, the variable of applicant in-
come had the largest effect on overall loan amount and 
was statistically significant. For every $1,000 increase 
in income the loan amount will rise by $1058. Loan 
amount is also a factor of time, measured in months, 
and was statistically significant. As each month pass-
es the loan amount will increase by $284 holding all 
other variables constant. This could be due to infla-
tion, the improving economy, a rising local housing 
market or a combination of the three. Additionally the 
constant term indicated that when all other variables 
took a value of zero the loan amount would still be 
$24,566. The dummy variable implemented was again 
used to remove the residual outlier from December 
2016. I can confidently reject the F-statistic as well, 
and assume that the coefficients take a value other 
than zero. Finally, the adjusted R-square took a value 
of 0.5266 indicating that the independent variables 
explain 52.6% of the variance in the loan amount. The 
residual diagnostics showed positive results, indicating 
no autocorrelation and normally distributed residuals 
with a constant variance. 
In 1992 Vandall studied the relationship be-
tween the loan-to-value and default risk in mortgage 
lending. He found that an increase in the ratio was 
strongly correlated with mortgage default. Addition-
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ally, Ambrose found that underwriting standards will 
help determine the amount of debt issued. Here I am 
examining risk associated with mortgage lending, both 
to the bank and the consumer. While underwriting 
standards are unique to each lender and personalized 
to each borrower, I am attempting to quantify the loan 
amount using two independent variables. The findings 
could be useful in numerous ways. Bank and lending 
underwriters could use this to see how much of an im-
pact these variables have on overall loan amounts. To 
further this study a number of changes and additions 
could be made. To gain further explanatory power on 
the loan amount additional variables could be added 
to the equation. For instance, credit score could be 
included as an independent variable in attempting to 
explain the loan amount. Additionally bank size could 
be a contributing factor to the loan amount, and may 
be a reason why we see a glass ceiling when applicant 
income is increasing. Further analysis of the local 
housing market, both pre-recession and post-recession, 
could provide more insight into lending conditions and 
help explain the variables trends and patterns. These 
variables could be implemented in the future to gain 
further knowledge of what effects the loan amount 
while analyzing the local housing market to see its 
affects on lending. 
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